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Operation of the "Escalator Clause"
in Fringe Benefit Cases
Jonathan L.F. Silver*
Desire for simple and certain law may tempt judges to take
an uncompromising approach in construing a statute, particu-
larly when the broad concern of the legislature is easily under-
stood. Unfortunately, such an approach may interfere with a
reasoned application of the statute to the specific problem that
the legislature sought to remedy. That problem therefore might
remain shrouded until it is illuminated by the factual patterns
of many later cases-cases that may, however, sleep fitfully
in the procrustean bed that earlier courts have prepared for
them. The last decade of judicial construction of the federal
statute1 that grants certain reemployment rights to veterans who
return to their civilian jobs after a short period of military serv-
ice reveals a tension between rigid and flexible responses to the
statutory mandate. None of the current approaches to the
statute is satisfying or firmly established,2 and although the
Supreme Court has recently spoken to the issue in one context,3.
results under other circumstances remain uncertain.4 That. no,
approach has yet achieved wide acceptance may be the result
of a failure by the judiciary to carefully consider why Congress
* Special Assistant to the General Counsel of the United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
1. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 2021-26 (Supp. 1, Feb. 1975), formerly 50
U.S.C. App. §§ 459(b), (c), (e), (f), (g) (1970).
2. See Haggard, Veterans' Reemployment Rights and the, "Escala-
tor Principle," 51 B.U.L. REv. 539, 567-82 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Haggard]; The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 142-49
(1966); Comment, Reemployment Rights: The Veteran land the Vaca-
tion Benefit, 53 B.U.L. REv. 480 (1973). Compare Locaynia v. American
Airlines, Inc., 457 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982
(1972) (vacation pay), and Hoffman v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 477
F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1973) (supplemental unemployment benefits), with
Foster v. Dravo Corp., 490 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1973) (vacation pay), aff'd,
420 U.S. 92 (1975), and Kasmieir v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 437 F.2d
151 (10th Cir. 1971) (vacation pay).
3. Foster v. Dravo Corp., 420 U.S. 92 (1975) (vacation pay for
years partially spent in military service).
4. See id. at 101 n.9.
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elected to require broad restoration of some incidents of employ-
ment but was content with a narrow grant of others.
I. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS OF VETERANS
When the Government either conscripts an employed man or
accepts a jobholder as a volunteer for military service, it neces-
sarily interrupts his civilian employnent. And upon his return
to civilian status, that person may suffer certain undesirable
consequences. For example, a veteran might be denied the
opportunity to return to his former job and then encounter diffi-
culty finding another. Even if he is permitted to return to his
original job, his employer might treat him as a new employee,
returning him to the bottom of both the seniority ladder and pay
scale. The employer might also refuse to grant certain "fringe
benefits," such as vacation pay, sick leave, and pension rights,
which would have accrued had the veteran not left his job. To
ameliorate some of these unfortunate consequences, Congress has
provided reemployment rights for qualified returning draftees
and short-term enlistees.
These rights, which in their current form were originally
mandated in anticipation of World War II,5 now have been codi-
fied in Title 38 of the United States Code6 by the Vietnam Era
Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974.7 Four relevant
obligations have been imposed on both public8 and private
employers.9 They must restore a qualified employee' 0 to his
preservice position, or one of "like seniority, status, and pay";"
consider a returning veteran "as having been on furlough or
5. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 8, 54
Stat. 885.
6. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 2021-26 (Supp. 1, Feb. 1975).
7. Act of Dec. 3, 1974, Pub. I. No. 93-508, 88 Stat. 1594.
8. The Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of
1974 made the statute applicable to state and local governments. 38
U.S.C.A. § 2021(a) (B) (Supp. 1, Feb. 1C,75). Previously, only the fed-
eral government was covered. See 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(b) (C) (1970)
(repealed 1974). The Act also extended coverage under the statute to
employees of the United States Postal Service and the Postal Rate
Commission. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2023 (a) (Supp. 1, Feb. 1975).
9. Not all private employers are so obliged, however. The statute
exempts those whose business circumstances have so changed as to make
compliance impossible or unreasonable. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2021 (a) (B)
(Supp. 1, Feb. 1975).
10. The veteran must be "still qualified to perform the duties" of
his former position. Id. §§ 2021(a) (A) (i), (a) (B) (i).
11. Id.
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leave of absence" ;12 restore the employee "without loss of senior-
ity"; '1 3 and permit him "to participate in insurance or other
benefits offered by the employer pursuant to established rules
and practices relating to employees on furlough or leave of
absence in effect with the employer at the time [the employee]
was inducted .... ,,14 In the 1948 reenactment of the Selective
Service Act of 1940,15 Congress added a subsection to codify the
"escalator principle," which the Supreme Court in Fishgold V.
Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp. 16 had articulated as the proper
construction of the World War II reemployment provisions. That
new provision, which remains a part of the current statute,
declared that it was the sense of Congress that on return to
civilian employment a veteran should be accorded "such status in
his employment as he would have enjoyed if he had continued in
such employment continuously from the time of his entering the
armed forces until the time of his restoration to such employ-
ment."'1  Fishgold, and hence the present reemployment rights
provisions, thus require an employer to credit a returning vet-
eran not only with the seniority that had accrued prior to his
induction, but also with the seniority that would have accrued
had his employment not been interrupted by his service in the
armed forces.
Unfortunately, Congress failed to define "status in employ-
ment" and "seniority," and added to the resulting confusion by
establishing an undefined category of "other benefits," subject
only to nondiscriminatory restoration.18  This failure has chal-
12. Id. § 2021(b) (1).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, Title I, 62 Stat. 604. See S. REP.
No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1948).
16. 328 U.S. 275 (1946) (dictum). In Fishgold, a reemployed vet-
eran complained that his employer had violated the statute by laying
him off for nine days while allowing nonveterans to continue working.
Although he conceded that even under the escalator principle the
nonveterans had greater seniority, the veteran argued that the layoff
was contrary to the interdiction of section 8(c) of the 1940 Act against
dismissal of a returning veteran within one year of his reemployment.
The Court ruled against the veteran, holding that the dismissal pro-
hibition did not encompass a temporary layoff necessitated by a de-
creased workload. Announcement of the escalator principle was thus
unnecessary to the decision.
17. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2021(b) (2) (Supp. 1, Feb. 1975) (originally en-
acted as Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 9 (c) (2), 62 Stat. 615).
18. Any person ... shall be so restored or reemployed with-
out loss of seniority, shall be entitled to participate in insur-
ance or other benefits offered by the employer pursuant to
established rules and practices relating to employees on fur-
lough or leave of absence in effect with the employer at the
time such person was inducted into such forces ....
19751
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lenged the courts to define each of these terms and to determine
their proper application to contemporary collective bargaining
agreements, which commonly govern an extremely broad range
of the conditions of an employer-employee relationship. The
parties might have agreed, for example, on provisions for fringe
benefits such as vacation, sick leave, pension, life insurance,
health care, and supplemental unemployment payments. Thus,
when denying escalated restoration of such benefits to reem-
ployed veterans, employers have asserted that fringe benefits
are not perquisites of "seniority," but rather come within the
statutory meaning of "other benefit;s" and hence are not subject
to the escalator principle. Veterans, on the other hand, have
argued that the particular benefit at issue is an element of
statutory "seniority," so that the escalator principle must apply.19
II. JUDICIAL ADHERENCE TO TRADITIONAL
NOTIONS OF SENIORITY
The Supreme Court laid the foundation for a narrow
perception of the scope of the escalator clause in Aeronautical
Industrial District Lodge 727 v. Campbell.20 The collective bar-
gaining agreement in Campbell accorded top seniority to union
chairmen regardless of the length of their employment. Despite
his longer tenure with the company, a veteran who had returned
to work was laid off while union chairmen were not. The Court
denied the veteran's claim to reinstatement, reasoning that since
Congress had not defined "seniority," it must have intended to
guarantee the veteran only those rights governed by the seniority
system established in the collective bargaining agreement in force
Id. § 2021(b) (1) (emphasis added).
19. See, e.g., Palmarozzo v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 490 F.2d 586
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 955 (1974) (severance pay); Foster
v. Dravo Corp., 480 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1973), affd, 420 U.S. 92 (1975) (vaca-
tion pay); Hoffman v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1973)
(supplemental unemployment benefits); Magma Copper Co. v. Eagar,
380 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 323 (1967), reh.
denied, 389 U.S. 1060 (1968) (holiday and vacation pay); Accardi v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 341 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1965), rev'd, 383 U.S. 225 (1966)
(severance pay); Nichols v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 76 CCR
Lab. Cas. f 10,836 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (sick days); Dufner v. Penn Cen-
tral Transp. Co., 374 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (medical insurance);
Parrish v. General Motors Corp., 75 CCH Lab. Cas. f 10,373 (S.D. Ind.
1974) (supplemental unemployment benefits); Litwicki v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Indus., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 296 (W.D. Pa.), af-f'd on other
grounds, 505 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1974) (pension).
20. 337 U.S. 521 (1949).
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at his place of work.21 On the theory that even under Camp-
bell the statute must require restoration of at least those rights
traditionally regarded as elements of seniority, several lower
courts adopted a slightly broader approach. They viewed job
title, order of promotion, and protection against layoff as sub-
ject to restoration, even if a particular collective bargaining
agreement did not tie those rights to seniority.22 Under either
view, however, restoration of fringe benefits, such as paid vaca-
tions, 23 could occur only if the collective bargaining agree-
ment specifically conditioned such benefits on seniority alone. 24
These circumscribed constructions of "seniority" led to
results that would be disapproved today.26 For example, some
courts failed to see that vacations, then the most frequently liti-
gated fringe benefit, are comprised of two distinct elements.
Collective bargaining agreements often base the length of vaca-
tion for which an employee may qualify in a given year on
the total number of years he has worked for his employer. On
the other hand, receipt of a paid vacation in a given year may
be contingent on the number of months or hours he worked dur-
ing that particular year. A veteran's request for vacation pay
for a year, all or part of which he had spent in military service,
thus differs from a claim that for purposes of determining the
length of a vacation in a later year, the years in military service
should count as years employed.
This difference went unnoticed, however, when vacations
were simplistically divorced from seniority. In Brown v. Watt
Car & Wheel Co.,26 for example, the collective bargaining agree-
ment granted a second week of vacation to employees who had
been "continuously in [the company's] employ for a period of
five years or more."27 The veteran had been employed with the
21. Id. at 526-29.
22. See, e.g., Brown v. Watt Car & Wheel Co., 182 'F.2d 570, 572
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 875 (1950) (dictum) (priorities with
respect to jobs, promotions, layoffs); Siaskiewicz v. General Elec. Co.,
166 F.2d 463, 465 (2d Cir. 1948) (dictum) (layoffs, promotions, vacation
length).
23. See, e.g., Brown v. Watt Car & Wheel Co., 182 F.2d 570, 572
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 875 (1950).
24. See generally cases cited in note 22 supra.
25. Compare, e.g., Brown v. Watt Car & Wheel Co., 182 F.2d 570
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 875 (1950) ("seniority" does not include
vacation length), with, e.g., Foster v. Dravo Corp., 420 U.S. 92, 101 n.9
(1975) ("seniority" does include vacation length), and Haggard, supra
note 2, at 578-79.
26. 182 F.2d 570 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 875 (1950).
27. 182 F.2d at 571.
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company for 21 months before serving three years in the military.
For the years following his return to work he claimed eligibility
for the extra week of vacation on the ground that time spent
in the service should, for that purpose, count as time of con-
tinuous employment with the company. The court of appeals
could not agree with the contention that "seniority includes
vacation with pay. '28 It relied on Siaskiewicz v. General Electric
Co.,2 9 a case in which veterans' claims for vacation pay for a year,
most of which they had spent in military service, had been
rejected. While the question at issue in Brown was not the same
as in Siaskiewicz, the court nevertheless failed to consider the
difference between seniority as a measure of the length of vaca-
tion for which an employee is eligible and seniority as a factor
on which receipt of vacation pay for a given year is based.30 The
court limited the statutory meaning of "seniority" to its "conven-
tional concept,"31 and thus excluded vacations without regard
for whether the purpose of escalated restoration of some em-
ployee benefits to returning veterans might encompass restora-
tion of some fringe benefits as well.
In Cushnier v. Ford Motor Co. 32 a district court took a
different, but still rigid, approach to the operative terms of the
reemployment rights statute. As in Brown, the veterans sought
a second week of vacation for years after reemployment. The
collective bargaining agreement awarded two weeks vacation to
employees with five years seniority if they had also been on the
"active rolls" at some time during each of the five years imme-
diately preceding the year for which vacation was requested.33
28. Id. at 572.
29. 166 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1948).
30. The same criticism can be leveled at three of the cases cited
at the conclusion of Brown, although not at two others. Compare
Dougherty v. General Motors Corp., 176 F.2d 561 (3d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 956 (1950), Dwyer v. Crosby Co., 167 F.2d 567 (2d Cir.
1948), and Woods v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 73 F. Supp. 871 (M.D. Pa.
1947), with Seattle Star v. Randolph, 168 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1948), and
Cushnier v. Ford Motor Co., 89 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
31. The conventional concept of seniority is that it consists of a
relative position among all employees within a specified job
group, determined by length of service with the employer, con-
ferring upon those having such seniority certain priorities with
respect to jobs, promotions, lay-offs and other such matters as
provided by the contract between the employer and the union.
182 F.2d at 572 (emphasis added).
32. 89 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Mich. 1959).
33. The similarity of the vacation provisions in Brown and Cush-
nier was probably not coincidental, but responsive to War Labor Board
policy. See F. WIswERT, FR r.E BEsNErs 29 (1959) (citing Ford Motor
Co., 4 War Labor Reports 33 (1942)) [hereinafter cited as WIsTERT].
[Vol. 60:45
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Although the veterans had accumulated five years seniority, they
had been in military service for all of one or more of the preced-
ing five years, and thus were unable to meet the second require-
ment for an extra week of vacation. The court reasoned that
the contract provision had not been adopted to prejudice the
reemployed veterans' rights, but rather was intended as a bona
fide work requirement on which award of the second week of
vacation was based. Therefore, the court concluded, the second
week of vacation was not purely a right of seniority but, under
the collective bargaining agreement, was intended to compensate
employees for work they had performed in prior years. Cush-
nier mirrored Brown in the sense that the court defined seniority
without considering why Congress would require anything at all
to be restored to the veteran. Instead, drawing on the Supreme
Court's language in Campbell, the court was satisfied to equate
the statutory use of the word with its use in the collective
bargaining agreement.34
The result in Mentzel v. Diamond35 broke the hold that the
conventional concept of seniority had on the statute. As in Brown
and Cushnier, the collective bargaining agreement allowed for
one week of vacation after one year of service, and two weeks
after five years of service. Asserting that under the statute his
years in the military should count toward the required five years,
the veteran sought two weeks vacation for the first full calendar
year of his reemployment. Since the agreement used the word
"service," thus not explicitly tying vacation to "seniority," and
since vacation was not generally regarded as a traditional ele-
ment of seniority, most of the decisions from this era suggest
that the veteran should have lost.36 But the court ruled for the
veteran, reasoning:
[W]hat the Act gives to the veteran is the right not to lose
his position or seniority by virtue of his absence in military or
naval service. He is protected, while away, to the same extent
as if he had been either continuously on the job in the plant or
away on furlough or leave of absence .... 37
The application of this rule in Mentzel, the court said, was
simple:
The veteran is to be treated, so far as benefits under the Act
are concerned, as though he had worked every day at the
34. 89 F. Supp. at 497 (quoting 337 U.S. at 526).
35. 167 F.2d 299 (3d Cir. 1948).
36. But see Siaskiewicz v. General Elec. Co., 166 F.2d 463, 465 (2d
Cir. 1948) (dictum) (vacation length distinguished from vacation pay).
37. 167 F.2d at 301. 'While merely a restatement of the Fishgold
"escalator principle," see text accompanying note 17 supra, this excerpt
marks the initial application of the principle to a fringe benefit.
1975]
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plant .... [H]e is entitled to whatever vacation rights would
have accrued to him had he not shouldered a gun and gone off
to war.3 8
Although the Mentzel court's view of what must be fully
restored to the veteran is much broader than that reflected in
other decisions, it is equally ill-conceived. The opinion reads as
though every benefit an employee would have received, includ-
ing wages he would have earned, :must be fully restored.39 Like
the other cases, Mentzel proceeds from a formula definition of
seniority-a different prescription, but also one that fails to ques-
tion why Congress would require full restoration of some benefits,
but only nondiscriminatory restoration of others.40
These cases, decided during the late 1940's and early 1950's,
were attempts to mechanically fit all benefits into two discrete
categories, which were distinguished, except in Mentzel, by
traditional notions of seniority. A judicious construction of the
statute, on the other hand, ought to reflect consideration of
whether traditional perceptions of seniority are necessarily con-
gruent with what Congress wanted to provide for those who left
secure jobs, 41 irredeemably interrupting the solidification and
growth of their economic status, to serve briefly and tempo-
rarily42 in the armed forces.
38. Id.
39. See Foster v. Dravo Corp., 420 U.S. 92, 101 (1975); Connett v.
Automatic Elec. Co., 323 F. Supp. 1373, 1377 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
40. In six other early cases, four circuit courts of appeals denied
claims by veterans to vacation pay. The court in Dougherty v. General
Motors Corp., 176 F.2d 561 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 956
(1950), and MacLaughlin v. Union Switch & Signal Co., 166 F.2d 46 (3d
Cir. 1948), did not specifically consider whether vacation pay could be
considered an element of seniority under the statute. Its premise, how-
ever, that the courts should enforce nondiscriminatory contractual
restrictions on vacation rights, implies that it thought of those rights as
beyond the meaning of seniority. Accord, Seattle Star v. Randolph, 168
F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1948) (severance pay). The unreasoned manner in
which the court in Siaskiewicz v. General Elec. Co., 166 F.2d 463 (2d
Cir. 1948), asserted that the right to vacation pay is not an element of
seniority suggests that the court viewed the statutory meaning of senior-
ity as limited to its traditional implications. Alvado v. General Motors
Corp., 229 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 983 (1956), reflects
an absence of rationale for the same assertion, although the case does
include citations to Siaskiewicz and Dwyer v. Crosby Co., 167 F.2d 567
(2d Cir. 1948). Finally, in Foster v. General Motors Corp., 191 F.2d 907
(7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 906 (1952), the court simply quoted
at length from prior decisions to sustain the "settled" conclusion that
vacation pay need not be restored.
41. The statute confers reemployment rights only on veterans who
left nontemporary positions. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2021(a) (Supp. 1, Feb. 1975).
42. Id. § 2024(a).
[Vol. 60:45
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III. RECOGNITION OF A BROADENED CONSTRUCTION
OF SENIORITY: THE BORGES, ACCARDI, AND
EAGAR WATERSHED
The supposition that the meaning of seniority in the statute
may transcend both traditional usage and the terms of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement first appeared in Borges v. Art Steel
Co.43 During the absence of the complaining veterans, their em-
ployer granted across-the-board wage increases to all employees
who had accumulated a specified period of "consecutive working
service." The collective bargaining agreement defined that con-
dition as at least 1800 hours per year of actual service, which,
under the rules and practices of the employer, employees on
leave of absence or furlough could not satisfy. In ruling for the
veterans, the court asserted that "the meaning of the word
'seniority' in the statute is not fixed by the local consensus of one
union and one employer."44 The wage increases, reasoned the
court, "became a regular part of the jobholder's pay or status,
swelling his pay check every week he worked in the future."45
To be sure, the benefit at issue in Borges did not differ sig-
nificantly from promotion, which is customarily regarded as
an element of seniority. Still, the case stands for the proposi-
43. 246 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1957). Arguably Dwyer v. Crosby Co.,
167 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1948), foreshadowed this development. Although
Judge Hand at first seemed to assume that "seniority" under the statute
could include no more than its traditional elements (absent an explicitly
broader definition in the collective bargaining agreement), a comment at
the end of his opinion may imply a more reasoned approach. A veteran
had returned to work on January 7 under an agreement that con-
ditioned paid vacation on work performed during 26 weeks prior to July
1 of each year. The veteran sought vacation pay for the year of his
return, even though he could not satisfy this work requirement. Not-
withstanding his unexplained assumption that paid vacation is an
"other benefit" within the meaning of the statute, subject only to con-
ditional restoration, Judge Hand concluded that "obviously the consider-
ations which might make it proper that service in the Army should not
affect a man's seniority are utterly different from those which should
count in computing vacation." Id. at 570. Although written in the
context of his assertion that vacations and seniority are wholly distinct
conceptually, Judge Hand thus seemed to recognize that there might be
reasons to require full restoration of at least some employee benefits,
if not vacations. He did not reveal the nature of the considerations he
had in mind, but it is possible that once discerned they would have
applied to some benefits beyond those traditionally considered to be
elements of seniority.
44. 246 F.2d at 739. Cf. Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v.
Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949).
45. 246 F.2d at 738-39.
1975]
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tion that a collective bargaining agreement that provides for con-
ditional receipt of a benefit that is not necessarily a traditional
element of seniority may violate the statute even if the condition
applies to veteran and nonveteran alike.
Seven years later, a district court seized on the slight, halt-
ing step taken in Borges and applied it to severance payments,
a benefit never before treated as one of the traditional elements
of seniority.4 6 In Accardi v. Pen.nsylvania Railroad47 veterans
had returned after World War II to their positions as firemen
on tugboats owned by the railroad. In 1960, the union and the
railroad agreed to abolish the position of tugboat fireman and
to have the railroad make a lump sum severance payment to
each fireman left without a job.48 The amount of the payment
was to be based on the number of years of "compensated service,"
which were defined as years in which the employee had worked
for the railroad on at least one day in each of seven months.
Thus, if at least six full months of any year had been spent in
the military or on any other form of leave of absence, it could not
be counted as a year of compensated service. Relying on Borges
and on what it perceived to be the general purpose of the statute,
the court held that the severance pay benefit was an attribute of
"seniority, status, [or] pay."49  It failed, however, to explain
exactly how that authority established that severance pay was a
benefit that had to be fully restored.
The court of appeals reversed the judgment,50 distinguish-
ing Accardi from Borges on the ground that the wage increases
in Borges were not fringe benefits, but were related to pay or
status and therefore subject to the escalator clause even though
not conditioned entirely on seniority. By contrast, it concluded
46. Cases in which the traditional elements of seniority had been
enumerated include Siaskiewicz v. General Elec. Co., 166 F.2d 463, 465(2d Cir. 1948); and Brown v. Watt Car & Wheel Co., 182 F.2d 570, 572
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 875 (1950). Cf. Seattle Star v. Ran-
dolph, 168 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1948) (traditional elements of seniority do
not include severance pay).
47. 229 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), rev'd, 341 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.
1965), rev'd 383 U.S. 225 (1966).
48. Firemen with 20 years or more seniority could have elected to
remain with the railroad. Others were discharged involuntarily.
49. The court construed section 459(c) (1) narrowly, 229 F. Supp.
at 196, in response to the employer's second argument that the statute
did not apply because the agreement was conceived more than one
year after the veterans had been restored to their jobs. It addressed
that argument only after determining that the benefit at issue was an
attribute of "seniority, status, [or] pay."
50. Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 341 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1965).
[Vol. 60:45
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that severance pay was neither compensation for services ren-
dered, nor a traditional element of seniority, nor as in Barges,
related to pay or status. The court did not address the nature of
the benefit in terms of why Congress would want to restore
some benefits but not others. Rather than piercing the statutory
language to discover the underlying policy considerations, it
mechanically applied the words "seniority," "pay," and "other
benefits" as if they inherently manifested legislative policy.
Reversing the court of appeals,51 the Supreme Court
worked a major change in reemployment rights of veterans-
a change attributable to the way in which lower courts, attempt-
ing to understand the statute, have seized on particular phrases
of the Court's opinion. The Court rejected the mechanical
approach to the statute that had prevailed among the lower
courts and instead directed its inquiry to the policy that Congress
sought to implement. It did not simply focus on the words of
the statute, but began its analysis with the statement that Con-
gress desired
to provide as nearly as possible that persons called to serve their
country in the armed forces should, upon returning to work in
civilian life, resume their old employment without any loss
because of their service to their country.52
Recognizing that Congress chose the term "seniority" as the
vehicle for such restoration, and that the lack of a statutory def-
inition for the term meant that its definition must be divined
primarily from private agreements, the Court nevertheless de-
clared that such agreements may not ascribe to the term a
definition inconsistent with the intent of Congress. 53 Thus, the
Court implied that there are benefits outside of the traditional
meaning of seniority that must be fully restored even though
they may not have been denominated as elements of seniority
in the collective bargaining agreement.
With regard to the particular benefit in Accardi, the Court
identified "the real nature of [the severance] payments [as]
compensation for loss of jobs. '54 Asserting that the loss of rights
and benefits accompanying loss of a job is generally related to
the seniority that an employee is obliged to forfeit, the Court
concluded that the payments were most accurately character-
ized as compensation for lost seniority. Thus, by attempting to
51. Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 383 U.S. 225 (1966).
52. Id. at 228.
53. Id. at 229.
54. Id. at 230.
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respond to congressional concern, the Court exhibited a willing-
ness to define seniority without specifically limiting the term to
its traditional meaning.55
The opinion included two unfortunate statements, however,
which some lower courts have insisted on applying as formulae
while ignoring the Court's analysis of the statute. First, the
Court stated that Congress intended to preserve for veterans "the
rights and benefits which would have automatically accrued
to them had they remained in private employment." 50  But
nothing really accrues automatically. Even the most traditional
elements of seniority are normally obtained by showing up for
work day after day.57 Had the veterans done that, however, they
also would have received, and with equal automaticity, all fringe
benefits, to say nothing of regular wages. Thus, application of
the "automatic accrual" test will result in awarding the veteran
whatever he asks for, and those courts that have applied such
a formula have always ruled for the veteran.58
Second, the Court seems to have been reluctant to treat as
"seniority" a benefit that is conditioned on work performed.5 9
Thus, in attempting to refute the railroad's argument that the
payments were based not on seniority but on total service, the
Court pointed out that the formula used to compute the pay-
ments might inadequately correlate the amount of a payment
to the amount of time actually worked. The Court noted that
under the formula an employee could be credited with a full
year of service if he worked but one day in each of seven
months-that is, seven carefully selected days per year. The
possibility of such a "bizarre result," it reasoned, established that
55. Cf. cases cited in note 46 supra.
56. 383 U.S. at 229 (emphasis added). Cases in which this general-
ization has been applied as a formula include Hoffman v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1973); Locaynia v. American Air-
lines, Inc., 457 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972);
Taylor v. Southern Pac. Co., 308 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Calif. 1969); accord,
Magma Copper Co. v. Eagar, 380 F.2d 318, 322 (9th Cir.) (dissenting
opinion), rev'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 323 (1967).
57. To the extent that such benefits would accrue to employees on
furlough or leave of absence, the statute requires restoration anyway.
38 U.S.C.A. § 2021(b) (1) (Supp. 1, Feb. 1975).
58. See, e.g., cases cited in note 56 supra and note 78 infra. In
Connett v. Automatic Elec. Co., 323 F. Supp. 1373, 1377 (N.D. Ill.
1971), the court recognized that the logic of the "automatic accrual"
test would require an employer to pay back wages to a returning
veteran since they, too, would have accrued automatically but for
induction. Accord, Foster v. Dravo Corp., 420 U.S. 92 (1975).
59. See Foster v. Dravo Corp., 420 U.S. 92 (1975); Cushnier v. Ford
Motor Co., 89 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
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the payments were not for time actually worked. But wholly
aside from the absence of suggestion that any employee had in
fact received credit for a year in which he had worked only seven
days,0 the Court did not merely conclude that whenever it is
possible to conceive of such "bizarre results," the benefit must
be deemed one of seniority. Rather, its point was that "the real
nature of these payments was compensation for loss of jobs." 61
The "bizarre results" language of the opinion-unnecessary,
since the Court's reasoning can stand on its own-has led several
lower courts astray62 and has contributed to the confusion and
conflict among the circuits in succeeding years.6 3
The Supreme Court's next venture into the scope of
statutory "seniority" did nothing to help the lower courts apply
the statute, and much to inhibit consistency. 4 In Eagar v.
Magma Copper Co.6 5 the collective bargaining agreement im-
posed two conditions on qualification for vacation pay and two
different conditions on eligibility for holiday pay. Vacation pay
was available to an employee in any given year as of the anni-
versary of his first day with the company if during the preced-
ing year he had worked at least 75 percent of all available shifts
and had been employed by the company on his employment anni-
versary date. The agreement specifically disqualified any em-
ployee who left the company prior to his anniversary date for
any reason other than layoff due to production cutbacks. An
employee would receive holiday pay if he had been continuously
on the payroll for the preceding three months and if he had
worked the regularly scheduled shifts immediately preceding and
following the holiday.
Eagar had worked for Magma from March 12, 1958 through
March 6, 1959 when he left for the armed forces. He had worked
at least 75 percent of the available shifts during that period, but
60. See Palmarozzo v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 490 F.2d 586, 591
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 955 (1974); The Supreme Court,
1965 Term, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 149 (1966).
61. 283 U.S. at 230 (emphasis added). Accord, Palmarozzo v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 490 F.2d 586, 589 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
955 (1974); Foster v. Dravo Corp., 490 F.2d 55, 58 (3d Cir. 1973), affd,
420 U.S. 92 (1975); See The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HEARv. L. REv.
91, 149 (1966).
62. See text accompanying notes 79-83 infra.
63. See cases cited in Foster v. Dravo Corp., 490 F.2d 55, 59-62 (3d
Cir. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 92 (1975).
64. See Haggard, supra note 2, at 572-76.
65. 389 U.S. 323 (1967), rev'g per curiam 380 F.2d 318 (9th Cir.
1966).
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was not employed by Magma on March 12, 1959, his anniversary
date. He returned to Magma on May 2, 1962 and worked the
shifts before and after Memorial Day and Independence Day that
year, but had not been on the payroll continuously for three
months prior to those two holidays. The district court held
that the company had violated the statute by refusing to award
Eagar vacation pay for 1958-59 and by refusing to pay him for the
two 1962 holidays. 66
The court of appeals, deciding the case before the Supreme
Court decided Accardi, reversed.67 First, posing the statutory
distinction between "seniority" an6. "other benefits" and quoting
from Borges, the court concluded that "other benefits" were
simply "fringe benefits.16 8  It then asserted that vacation pay
was that type of benefit. On the related ground that the collec-
tive bargaining agreement conditioned receipt of vacation pay
and holiday pay on additional factors, the court rejected the
veteran's argument that those benefits would have accrued from
the "mere passage of time" had military service not intervened.69
On petition for rehearing, filed in light of the Accardi
decision, the court of appeals, with one dissent, adhered to its
position.70 In its brief, two paragraph opinion, the court distin-
guished Accardi on the ground that the benefit in that case was
an element of seniority, not a fringe benefit. Thus, the court
failed to address the broader issue with which it was confronted
-whether Accardi required that some fringe benefits formerly
regarded as "other benefits" be considered elements of "seniority"
in order to effectively implement congressional policy. Accardi,
after all, involved severance pay, commonly regarded as a fringe
benefit rather than as a traditional. element of seniority-a fact
on which the Accardi court of appeals had relied in ruling against
the veteran.71 Thus, the Eagar court simply assumed its answer
and never explained how it decided whether to classify a partic-
ular benefit as "seniority" or "other. '72
66. The district court opinion is not reported.
67. Magma Copper Co. v. Eagar, 380 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1966).
68. Id. at 320-21.
69. Id. at 321.
70. Id.
71. Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 341 F.2d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1965).
72. Judge Madden's dissent is also unsatisfying. He argued that
Accardi mandated a ruling for the veterans because the benefits they
sought would have automatically accrued to them had they not entered
military service. This reasoning is premised on the belief that the
veterans would have remained in Magma's employ. But if that is true,
then all benefits conferred by employer on employee would have auto-
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The Supreme Court, reversing Eagar per curiam,73 did noth-
ing to ease the task of applying the statute. It merely cited
Accardi and made no attempt to explain how that case applied
to the facts in Eagar.7 4
Nevertheless, Accardi and Eagar at least support the proposi-
tion that the statutory definition of seniority is not limited to
traditional implications of the term. More significantly, the two
cases establish that labor unions and employers are no longer
entirely free to draft collective bargaining agreements that pre-
clude escalated restoration of benefits normally outside the scope
of seniority. But as a result of the ambiguity in the Eagar
opinion, the Supreme Court has left lower courts virtually free
to define the scope of benefits that must be fully restored.
Although Accardi could have been read to require consideration
of the underlying objectives of Congress, the opinion contained
rigid, formula-like language that diverted future decisionmaking
from this necessary inquiry. Some lower courts thus have con-
trived yet another procrustean bed in place of the one discarded
in Accardi and Eagar.
IV. CONFLICTING RESPONSES TO ACCARDI AND EAGAR
In response to the Supreme Court decisions in Accardi and
Eagar, lower courts have split roughly into two major groups,
although a third appears to be emerging. The courts in the first
group seem to have read Eagar to require award of all fringe
benefits that a veteran would have earned had he remained in
civilian employment. This position usually has been based
on the Eagar result and the "automatic accrual" language in
Accardi. It has also followed, however, from a court's belief that
"bizarre results," akin to those postulated in Accardi, might occur
under the terms of a particular collective bargaining agreement.
Thus, the courts that have hypothesized a construction of the
agreement that makes a sham of the work requirement on which
a benefit is conditioned have concluded that the benefit there-
fore must derive from seniority rather than labor.
The courts in the second group generally have examined the
particular collective bargaining agreement as a whole to deter-
mine whether its work requirement is real or fictional. Rather
matically accrued, including wages. Such a broad definition of "senior-
ity" would leave "other benefits" bereft of meaning.
73. 389 U.S. 323 (1967).
74. Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, dis-
sented. Id. at 323.
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than attempting to imagine a construction that renders the re-
quirement a sham, these courts have held a benefit not to derive
from seniority if the agreement can be reasonably construed to
condition receipt of the benefit on a bona fide work requirement.
The courts in the third, yet emerging, group have adopted a
more sensible approach to reemployment rights. They proceed
from an inquiry, as yet not clearly or carefully articulated as
the basis for decision, into why Congress would mandate full
restoration of a benefit in the first place.75
Locaynia v. American Airlines, Inc. 78 represents the group
of cases in which the Supreme Court opinions have been read
to establish a test of "automatic accrual." In Locaynia the
veterans sought full vacation pay for the year of their return
and the year following. The employer had made no such pay-
ment for the year of return and only partial payment for
the year following under an agreement that provided 10 days
of paid vacation during a given year unless an employee had
been on leave of absence, as had these veterans, for more than
60 days during the prior year.77
The court of appeals reversed a judgment for the employer,
but made little attempt to explain the meaning of the statute.
It quoted language from Accardi to the effect that seniority must
not be given a narrow or technical meaning and that Congress
intended to provide a veteran with all benefits that would have
accrued to him automatically. The court construed the Su-
preme Court's per curiam reversal of Eagar, a case from the same
circuit, to mean that the right to vacation pay must always come
within the statutory meaning of seniority. The majority of the
court did not respond to the argument of the dissent that, unlike
75. Courts in what is perhaps a fourth group have proceeded least
sensibly by aimlessly relying in the same opinion on two or three of
the other theories, apparently hoping they have adopted the proper
approach. See, e.g., Davis v. Alabama Power Co., 383 F. Supp. 880(E.D. Ala. 1974).
76. 457 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972).
Compare the same court's opinion in Austin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
504 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1974). The result in Locaynia-"automatic
accrual" applied to vacation benefits-was rejected in Foster v. Dravo
Corp., 420 U.S. 92 (1975).
77. As of December 31 of each year, each employee with one to
five years of continuous service became entitled to 10 days of paid vaca-
tion during the succeeding year, decreased by one day for each 30 days
of leave he had taken in excess of 60. Employees with five or more
years of service were entitled to longer vacations, subject to propor-
tionally greater diminishment. All the plaintiffs had less than five
years of service with the company. 457 F.2d at 1254 n.2, 1255 n.5.
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the plaintiffs in Locaynia, the veteran in Eagar had fulfilled the
substantive work requirement for vacation pay,78 and that cases
subsequent to Eagar in which veterans' claims for vacation bene-
fits had been sustained all involved work requirements that had
been satisfied.79 Neither did the majority attempt to define
"automatic accrual," nor limit the implications of that concept
in any way.
In Hoffman v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.s0 the court of appeals
applied the "bizarre results" language of Accardi as the appropri-
ate test of seniority, but without considering whether it lay at the
heart of the Supreme Court's decision in Accardi. Employees of
Bethlehem earned one-half of a supplemental unemployment
benefit (SUB) credit for each week in which they had "hours [of]
work for the company."81 SUB credits could be exchanged for
cash in the event of layoff. Bethlehem had denied the veteran's
claim to SUB credits for the period of his military service. The
court posed the traditional compartmentalization of "seniority"
and "other benefits." Categorization of SUB credits, it reasoned,
depended on whether the credits accrued merely with the passage
of time or whether some further act was required. Although
the agreement required "hours work for the company" each
78. Although not suggested in the court's opinion, it is possible to
argue that the work requirement in Locaynia was a sham. So much of
the contract as was printed in the opinion did not provide that laid-off
employees would be denied vacation benefits. If substantial time on
layoff status was a real possibility for employees governed by the con-
tract, then the work requirement might be deemed fictional, but not in
the theoretical, improbable sense suggested in Accardi. See authorities
cited in note 60 supra. The result in Austin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
504 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1974), may lend support to this reading of
Locaynia. The author expresses his gratitude to William Noble, a
student at Columbia University School of Law, for this perceptive
analysis.
79. See Ewert v. Wrought Washer Mfg. Co., 477 F.2d 128 (7th
Cir. 1973), affg 335 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Bixon v. Wur-
litzer Co., 75 CCH Lab. Cas. 10,372 (W.D.N.Y. 1974); Price v. Ter-
minal R.R. Ass'n, 75 CCH Lab. Cas. 10,345 (E.D. Mo. 1974); Messina v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 315 F. Supp. 340 (W.D.N.Y. 1970);
Taylor v. Southern Pac. Co., 308 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Calif. 1969); cf.
Hollman v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 435 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1970);
Morton v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 405 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1969).
80. 477 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1973).
81. Id. at 861. Employees earned one-half of a SUB credit per
week even without "hours [of] work for the company" if they had hours
of earned vacation, jury duty, union office responsibility, or certain
kinds of disability during the week. Id. The Hoffman court did not
purport to base its decision on these exceptions. Id. at 863-64. But see
Foster v. Dravo Corp., 490 F.2d 55, 59 (3d Cir. 1973), affd, 420 U.S. 92
(1975).
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week, apparently a condition other than mere passage of time,
the court asserted that as in Accardi, such a requirement might
produce "bizarre -results": "[I]n Bethlehem's plan no distinction
is made between an employee who works I hour during the week
and one who works 40 hours during the week.18 2 On this basis,
the court held that the SUB plan was an element of seniority.8 3
In applying the "bizarre results" language as the test for
seniority, the Hoffman court failed to adequately consider the
Supreme Court's emphasis on the "real nature" of a benefit. It
also did not consider whether Bethlehem, in fact, would retain
an employee who reported for work for but one hour each week.
Thus, the court apparently did not care that the perceived
bizarre result might never occur.8 4 The Hoffman opinion is an
attempt to fit every case into an easily articulated and applied
formula, an approach unsatisfactory for failing to consider con-
gressional purpose and for ignoring the probable meaning of the
collective bargaining agreement.
Rejection of the Hoffman assumption that provisions in a
collective bargaining agreement can be construed without refer-
ence to the probable intent of the parties characterizes the
second and largest group of cases decided after Accardi and
Eagar. Courts in this group have sought to determine and
base their decisions on the most reasonable application of the
contractual provisions that condition receipt of particular bene-
fits. In Foster v. Dravo Corp.,8 5 for example, the agreement
stipulated that an employee must receive earnings from the com-
pany in at least 25 weeks of a calendar year to qualify for a
full paid vacation. The veteran had been inducted after only
nine weeks of earnings and resumed his employment only 13
weeks before the end of the following year. Against the vet-
eran's claim to full vacation pay for both years, the court of
appeals upheld a judgment for the employer. Since an em-
ployee would have received earnings in a week even if he had
worked only one hour and thus would have qualified for full
82. 477 F.2d at 863.
83. Cf. Akers v. General Motors Corp., 501 F.2d 1042, 1046 (7th
Cir. 1974).
84. Admittedly, the Supreme Court in Accardi did not ask such a
question either. It did ask, however, what the real nature of the benefit
was. The unfortunate "bizarre results" language was not the Court's
test for seniority, but rather was an illustration that the real nature of
the severance payments was compensation for loss of employment rights
accumulated over time. See notes 60-63 supra and accompanying text.
85. 490 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1973), affd, 420 U.S. 92 (1975).
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vacation pay under the literal terms of the agreement, the court
acknowledged that the contract would have supported a "bizarre
result" finding. It refused, however, to base its decision on an
application of contractual language not likely intended by the
parties. The court's belief that the parties understood that some-
thing approximating a customary workweek was required for a
given week to count as one of the 25, and that the contract would
be so construed in an arbitration proceeding, formed the rationale
for its decision.8 6
Some courts have adopted a third approach to the statute
by focusing on the Supreme Court's concern in Accardi for the
'"real nature" of employment benefits. These courts have at-
tempted to determine the "real nature" of the particular benefit
and whether that nature partakes of seniority. This approach
seems to have been first adopted, although not explicitly, in
Connett v. Automatic Electric Co.8 7 The collective bargaining
agreement in that case provided for paid vacation in a given year
for all employees who had one or more years of seniority and
who were on the payroll as of December 31 of the preceding year.
Three veterans, each of whom had accumulated more than a year
of seniority before entering military service, asserted that vaca-
tion benefits had accrued during their temporary absence.
The employer agreed that for purposes of computing the length
of vacation to which an employee would be entitled, a year in
the military would count as a year with the company. Basing
his decision on the failure of the veterans to comply with the
December 31 payroll requirement, however, the employer denied
vacation pay for the years spent in the military.
The district court granted the employer's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the ground that the veterans had not earned
86. Accord, Litwicki v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Indus., Inc., 505
F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1974) (pension); Austin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504
F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1974) (vacation pay); Kasmieir v. Chicago, R.I. &
Pac. R.R., 437 F.2d 151 (10th Cir. 1971) (vacation pay); Dugger v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 403 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
907 (1969) (vacation pay); Wolf v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 75 CCH
Lab. Cas. 10,531 (E.D. La. 1974) (vacation pay); Parrish v. General
Motors Corp., 75 CCH Lab. Cas. 10,373 (S.D. Ind. 1974) (supple-
mental unemployment benefits); Dufner v. Penn Central Transp. Co.,
374 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (medical benefits); Fees v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 335 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (vacation pay); Bradley
v. General Motors Corp., 283 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Mo. 1968) (absence
allowance); cf. Akers v. General Motors Corp., 501 F.2d 1042 (7th Cir.
1974) (supplemental unemployment benefits); LiPani v. Bohack Corp.,
368 F. Supp. 282 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (vacation pay and sick leave).
87. 323 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
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vacation pay for the years involved. Although the unfulfilled
contractual requirement in Connett was identical to the one in
Eagar, the Connett court nevertheless distinguished Eagar on the
ground that the veteran there had earned a paid vacation because
he had worked for nearly the full year. The crucial difference in
Connett was that the absence of the veterans on December 31
reflected their absence from work all year as well, and hence
their failure to earn the claimed benefit.
The theoretical basis of the decision, however, appears in the
court's response to the veterans' argument that under the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, paid vacation was consideration for
merely remaining on the payroll as of December 31, and not for
work performed. Although the employer replied that the Decem-
ber 31 requirement was also a minimum work requirement, the
court took a different view:
This type of semantic simplicity by both plaintiffs and defend-
ants is dangerous and premised upon an erroneous assumption.
Certainly, the intent of Congress cannot be determined on the
basis of the language utilized by or the intrinsic guiding intent
of negotiation in collective bargaining sessions .... Until the
Supreme Court or our Court of Appeals informs us to the con-
trary, we cannot believe that Congress intended returning vet-
erans to receive vacation pay for periods of time in which they
did not work a single day, and for which periods they likewise
failed to meet the contractual standard of eligibility.8 8
The court thus rejected the argument that veterans should re-
ceive whatever would have accrued automatically, because such
a view would have effectively eliminated the "other benefits"
clause from the statute by requiring, in addition to other con-
siderations, payment of regular wages.
The Connett opinion represents an important step in the
direction of proper construction of the statute. Its emphasis on
the intent of Congress is refreshing, as is its focus on the nature
of the benefit. The court failed to explain, however, why it con-
cluded that Congress did not intend the returning veterans to
receive vacation pay. Nor did it offer reasons to support its con-
clusion that the very nature of vacation pay is such that it right-
fully cannot be considered an element of the seniority Congress
intended to preserve. But unlike most of its predecessors,
Connett at least invites such inquiries.
Several courts have recently offered responses to these
unanswered questions. In Palmarozzo v. Coca-Cola Bottling
88. Id at 1379.
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Co.8 9 the veteran had served in the military for a six-month
period sandwiched between four and a half years of work for
his employer. The collective bargaining agreement provided that
an employee would become eligible to receive severance pay once
he had accumulated five "service credits." One-fourth of a credit
was earned for each 400 hours of regular working time; one credit
thus represented roughly a year of work. Since the veteran had
accumulated only four and one-half credits during his actual time
on the job, his eligibility for severance pay depended on whether
the statute required credit for the half year spent in the military.
The court of appeals held that the service credits came within
the statutory meaning of seniority. While rejecting a bona fide
work requirement analysis, the majority of the court embraced
neither the sweeping "automatic accrual" test of seniority
adopted in Locaynia nor the Hoffman "bizarre results" test.9 0
Rather, it relied on Accardi for the proposition that
the "real nature" of severance benefits which accrue with years
of service was not compensation no matter how the benefits
were calculated, but rather was payment for loss of seniority
rights acquired over years of employment.91
The court pointed out that a test based on a work requirement
could undermine the purpose of the statute, since a collective
bargaining agreement might condition receipt of any benefit,
even one customarily recognized as an element of seniority, on
work performed.
Palmarozzo was the first post-Accardi decision based on an
examination of the "real nature" of the benefit at issue. Thus, in-
stead of focusing on whether a work requirement was prescribed
in the collective bargaining agreement, 92 the court considered
the role of a particular benefit in an employee's career. The
opinion might be analytically vulnerable since it is based on
the assumption that Congress intended full restoration of some
benefits regardless of the provisions in a particular collective bar-
gaining agreement. That premise, however, had been accepted
earlier, at least with regard to the traditional elements of sen-
89. 490 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 955 (1974).
90. Dissenting, 490 F.2d at 593, Judge Friendly relied on the theory
that since the collective bargaining agreement tied the benefit closely
to work actually performed, it could not come within the statutory
meaning of seniority.
91. 490 F.2d at 589.
92. This appears to be Judge Friendly's interpretation of the "real
nature" language in Accardi. Accord, Litwicki v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Indus., Inc., 505 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1974).
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iority,93 and in the light of Accardi, might merit broader ap-
plication. 4 Regardless, the seminal importance of Palvaarozzo
is clear. It is the first case in which a decision was firmly
grounded on analysis of the generic type of benefit involved,
irrespective of the form in which that benefit had been cast
under the collective bargaining agreement. 95
The Palmarozzo style of inquiry has been applied with in-
teresting results elsewhere. In Litwicki v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Industries, Inc.9 6 the collective bargaining agreement pro-
vided that an employee's pension rights would vest on accumu-
lation of at least 10 years of "continuous service." The actual
amount of the pension was computed on the basis of the total
years of continuous service. Employees earned credit for con-
tinuous service in units of twelfths of a year, one for each 125
hours worked. In addition, the agreement required the company
to credit time spent in the military, but only during war or
pursuant to conscription. The veteran had earned seven and
ten-twelfths credits on the job and one credit for wartime military
service. He could qualify for a pension only if he received
credit for the two and ten-twelfths years he had spent voluntarily
in peacetime military service.9 7 The district court ruled for the
veteran, peering into an "academic crystal ball"98 to distinguish
between vesting the employee with pension rights and awarding
a pension of a particular amount:
We believe that the primary purpDse of the retirement benefit
is to promote personnel stability by giving the employee an in-
centive to remain with the company ... Thus the vesting of
pension rights is dependent upon ihe length of the relationship
rather than the amount of actual work performed. On the other
hand the amount of the benefits is properly dependent on the
actual work performed as measured by monthly earnings.99
Litwicki thus stands for the proposition that vesting of
93. See cases cited in note 22 supra.
94. In Accardi, the Supreme Court did not have to address the
issue because there the agreement arguably did not substantially cor-
relate credit for a year with a year of work. In Palmarozzo, such correla-
tion did exist.
95. See Comment, Veterans' Reemployment Rights: Severance Pay,
1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 296.
96. 386 F. Supp. 296 (W.D. Pa. 1973), af'd on other grounds, 505
F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1974).
97. Since the veteran had enlisted, he could not rely on the con-
tract provision that accorded credit for military service pursuant to
conscription.
98. 386 F. Supp. at 303 (citing The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80
I-ARv. L. REV. 91, 148 (1966)).
99. Id. at 305.
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pension rights is within the statutory meaning of seniority but
that awarding a pension of a particular amount is not. The court,
however, failed to explain why the concept that motivated its
decision as to vesting was not equally applicable to resolving the
amount of the award. Consequently, the opinion is far from a
satisfying answer to the broad question of what Congress in-
tended to include as elements of seniority. Nevertheless, the
court's treatment of vesting reflects the Palmarozzo concept
that the scope of the statute depends on the role of the benefit
in the broad context of labor-management relations, even if a
collective bargaining agreement ties the benefit to hours of
work.100
Smith v. Industrial Employers & Distributors Associa-
tion 01 also evidences sensitivity to the "real nature" line of
inquiry, but a less than full understanding of the concept. The
collective bargaining agreement ties the benefit to hours of
each year on 1730 hours of work during the year. Although
the veteran's pension rights had vested, the amount of his
monthly check would have been greater if he were credited for
the time he had spent in the military. The district court cited
Accardi and Palmarozzo for the proposition that an employer's
attempt to define pension rights in terms of hours of work must
fail if the "real nature" of the benefit at issue renders it an ele-
ment of seniority. The amount of the pension award was thus
held to be an element of seniority since, similar to the severance
pay benefits in Accardi, it essentially was compensation for "loss"
of job and concomitant seniority rights. The court asserted,
although without explanation, that such compensation should be
based entirely on years of service.
Notwithstanding this otherwise sensible application of
Accardi and Palmarozzo, the Smith court gratuitously added that
the contract requirement of 1730 hours of work per year, an
average of 33 hours every week, was not a true work require-
ment. Because an employee who worked more than 1730 hours
would receive no more credit than one who worked just 1730
hours, the court reasoned that the requirement was but another
100. The court of appeals construed the agreement to allow vesting
credit for all time spent in the military. 505 F.2d at 193. Thus,
although it rejected the district court's approach to the definition of
seniority, id. at 193, it affirmed the judgment. The district court had
suggested the construction of the contract on which the court of appeals
based its affirmance, however, 386 F. Supp. at 304, but seems not to
have relied on it.
101. 75 CCH Lab. Cas. 10,480 (N.D. Calif. 1974).
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way of marking time. But 33 hours of work per week is a sub-
stantial requirement, and it is hard to characterize a benefit con-
ditioned on such a requirement as one that is unearned. 0 2 Hence,
Smith was wrongly decided if the court believed that a particular
benefit could be considered an element of seniority only in the
absence of a true work requirement. 0 3 The court should have
asserted that the "real nature" of the benefit governed, regardless
of any true work requirement.'0 4
The decision of the court of appeals in Foster v. Dravo
Corp.,105 although turning on the question whether the vaca-
tion benefit at issue was contingent on a bona fide work require-
ment, also reflects a certain responsiveness to the "real nature"
type of analysis. And while the court did not adopt this ap-
proach, one of the judges seems to have recognized its signifi-
cance. 106 In Foster the veteran claimed vacation pay for years in
which military service had prevented him from satisfying the
contractual provision on which the benefit was conditioned. The
court of appeals recognized two types of benefits that a person
derives from employment. One type, the court reasoned, is long
term in nature, such as the job security that comes from the
knowledge that the longer a person remains with his employer,
the more likely it is that through operation of a seniority sys-
tem he will continue to have the opportunity to earn a living.
The second, short term in nature, includes benefits such as the
daily wages a worker earns for his labor. Suggesting that statu-
tory seniority could be defined to include only benefits of a long-
term nature, the court observed that the right to paid vacation
in a given year "is normally and reasonably considered part of
a worker's current or short term" benefits, but did not rest its
decision on that observation. 07
The Supreme Court reentered the dispute over proper
application of the escalator clause when it elected to review the
Foster decision. 08 Adopting a rationale similar to the major
theory of the court of appeals, a unanimous Court'09 held that
the escalator clause would not entitle a veteran to vacation pay
102. Cf. Foster v. Dravo Corp., 420 U.S. 92, 94 (1975).
103. Id.
104. See text accompanying notes 85-86 supra.
105. 490 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1973), affd, 420 U.S. 92 (1975).
106. 490 F.2d at 64 (Hastie, J., concurring).
107. 490 F.2d at 63.
108. Foster v. Dravo Corp., 419 U.S. 823 (1974) (writ of certiorari
granted).
109. Justice Douglas did not participate.
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if the collective bargaining agreement reasonably related the
benefit to a bona fide work requirement. Although the Court
referred to vacation pay as a short-term benefit, it did not
develop that concept to reach its decision. Rather, it affirmed
the judgment of the court of appeals that the work requirement
in the Foster agreement was sufficiently related to the benefit
to render the escalator clause inapplicable.
Thus, the Supreme Court resolved the conflict among the
"automatic accrual,'" 10 "bizarre results,""' and "bona fide work
requirement" 112 interpretations of Accardi and Eagar in settling
the applicability of the escalator clause at least to vacation
pay.1 3 The Court authorized denial of vacation pay to a
veteran for a year in which he failed to meet a work require-
ment, provided that the requirement could be reasonably con-
strued to establish that the parties intended that employees
would earn the benefit. The Court tacitly acknowledged that
the escalator clause would apply to computation of vacation
length in the years following reemployment." 4
By failing, however, to develop and explore the long-term/
short-term distinction suggested by the court of appeals, the
Supreme Court has provided less guidance than it might have
to lower courts that must construe the statute in other contexts.
Indeed, in light of the "real nature" language in Accardi, the
Court's acceptance of a bona fide work requirement as the crucial
determinant of statutory effect may produce further confusion
and conflict in the lower courts when the escalator clause bears
110. See cases cited in note 79 supra.
111. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 860 (3d
Cir. 1973); cf. Akers v. General Motors Corp., 501 F.2d 1042, 1046 (7th
Cir. 1974).
112. See cases cited in note 86 supra.
113. 420 U.S. at 101 n.9.
114. Id. The decision, however, seems already to have been mis-
read by at least one court of appeals. In Jackson v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 517 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1975), the court erroneously construed
the statutory meaning of seniority by failing to recognize the difference
between vacation pay for a year in which the veteran did not fulfill a
bona fide work requirement and vacation length in the year following
his reemployment. The collective bargaining agreement conditioned the
latter on the amount of "work time" that an employee had served and
provided that accumulation of "work time" would be interrupted by
all leaves of absence, including those for military service, in excess of
30 days. The court read Foster for the proposition that the statute pre-
cluded escalated restoration of any benefit conditioned on a bona fide
work requirement. Id. at 1326. Such a reading seems inconsistent with
footnote 9 of Foster and, at the least, is an unwarranted and indefensible
extension of the principles enunciated in the case.
19751
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
on other benefits.11 5 Additionally, its statement that the ques-
tion before it was limited to vacation benefits, along with its
assiduous avoidance of references to fringe benefits generally,
suggest that the Court may not have intended to formulate a rule
of universal applicability. Furthermore, it declined to review a
severance pay case brought before it in the same term, letting
stand a result inconsistent with the bona fide work requirement
approach." 6 Thus, even though consideration of the intended
effect of a bona fide work requirement may have produced an
acceptable result in Foster, the Supreme Court's failure to an-
nounce a broader principle of construction suggests the need
for a fresh approach to determining the proper scope of the
escalator clause.
V. DEFINITION OF "SENIORITY" AND "OTHER BENEFITS"
IN LIGHT OF CONGRESSIONAL POLICY
The state of the law regarding the proper definition of
seniority under the statutory reemployment rights provisions
is unsettled1 7 and unsatisfying. Yet, one may expect a goodly
number of cases requiring application of such a definition to
appear on federal court dockets for some time. Although con-
scription has ended, enlistment has not. And in any event,
115. In both Palmarozzo v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 490 F.2d 586
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 955 (1974), and Smith v. Industrial
Employers & Dist. Ass'n, 75 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 10,480 (N.D. Calif. 1974),
the courts ruled for the veterans by adhering to Accardi and examining
the "real nature" of the benefits at issue. Yet it is clear that despite
the attempts by those two courts to discount the significance of the rele-
vant work requirements, 490 F.2d at 591 n.4, 75 CCH Lab. Cas. at
17,665, the "loosely correlated work requirement" test advanced in
Foster, if applicable to the benefits at issue in Palmarozzo and Smith,
would make both those cases wrongly decided. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Pamarozzo, the case in which
Judge Friendly offered his spirited "work requirement test" dissent,
and its nearly simultaneous decision to review Foster can only produce
additional confusion and uncertainty for lower courts.
116. Palmarozzo v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 490 F.2d 586 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 955 (1974).
117. In Foster v. Dravo Corp., 420 U.S. 92, 93-94 (1975), the Supreme
Court decided that the statute does not "[entitle] a veteran to vaca-
tion benefits when, because of his departure for military service, he has
failed to satisfy a substantial work requirement upon which the vaca-
tion benefits are conditioned." It failed, however, to define the range
of benefits to which an unfulfilled work requirement may be a bar, and
to decide whether vacation benefits not expressly conditioned on a
work requirement must be provided to the returning veterans. Cf.
Connett v. Automatic Elec. Co., 323 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
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returned veterans of earlier days will likely expand the class
of potential plaintiffs as they approach retirement age.118
Few, if any, of the courts that have contributed to the present
confusion even considered why a presumptively rational Con-
gress would have mandated escalated restoration of some bene-
fits of employment but not of others. Perhaps such a focus will
direct analysis of the problem to channels not yet adequately
explored and thus lead to a construction of the statute based
on the policy Congress intended to implement.
As other commentators have concluded, 119 the legislative
history sheds little light on what Congress expected the
reemployment rights provisions to accomplish, beyond the gen-
eral goal of "preserv[ing] certain benefits . . . such as seniority
rights and insurance benefits."'120  The committee reports12 1 do
not help to discern the intended scope of the original grant of
reemployment rights contained in the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940.122 Some floor remarks, however, suggest
a narrow scope under which an employer would have been
required to restore to the employee only rights and benefits that
had been accumulated up to the date he left civilian employ-
ment. 23  But whatever Congress intended in 1940, its 1948
codification 24 of the "escalator principle," first enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair
Co.,' 2 5 must guide the present search for the appropriate con-
struction of the statutory provisions.
In Fishgold, the Court stated that the reemployment rights
provisions of the 1940 Act
guarantee the veteran against loss of position or loss of seniority
by reason of his absence. He acquires not only the same senior-
118. See, e.g., Litwicki v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Indus., Inc., 386 F.
Supp. 296 (W.D. Pa.), affd on other grounds, 505 F.2d 189 (3d Cir.
1974).
119. See generally Haggard, supra note 2, at 540-41.
120. S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1948). The legislative
history of the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of
1974 is equally unenlightening.
121. S. REP. No. 2002, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); H.R. REP. No.
2937, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) (Conference Report).
122. Act. of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 8, 54 Stat. 890.
123. See 86 CONG. REc. 10,095 (1940) (remarks of Senator Sheppard);
id. at 10,107 (response of Senator Sheppard to question of Senator Don-
aher); id. at 10,572 (remarks of Senator Thomas).
124. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2021(b) (2) (Supp. 1, Feb. 1975).
125. 328 U.S. 275 (1946) (dictum). For explication of the case see
note 16 supra.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ity he had; his service in the armed forces is counted as service
in the plant so that he does not lose ground by reason of his
absence.' 26
The report of the Senate Committee accompanying the Selective
Service Act of 1948 explained the "escalator clause," as a change
in existing law.127 Unlike the 1940 Act, the new Act contained
an expression of congressional intent that restoration to employ-
ment should be in such a manner as to accord the veteran the
status he would have enjoyed had he remained continuously in
his civilian employment during the time of service in the armed
forces. 128  Consistent with that intent, the Supreme Court has
uniformly construed the escalator clause as a codification of Fish-
gold.'29  There is little beyond these factors to guide an
attempted statement of the benefits to which Congress envi-
sioned the escalator clause to apply. Nevertheless, if the percep-
tion of congressional intent expressed in Fishgold and the sub-
sequent statement of congressional intent found in the 1948 Act
are considered together with the precise nature of the employ-
ment relationship, an explanation can be derived as to why Con-
gress would want to treat a veteran as though he had remained
in civilian employment for some purposes, but not for others.
The briefly stated distinction of the court of appeals in Foster
v. Dravo Corp."30 between an employee's short-term and long-
term interests in a job is an essential element of this explanation.
On the one hand, a job furnishes an employee a day-to-day means
of living. The periodic wages received are a means to pay the
rent, put food on the table, clothe the body, and meet other
immediate expenses. In addition, a collective bargaining agree-
ment may ensure receipt of income during periods of illness or
layoff, periodic days of rest in the form of holidays and paid
vacations, and perhaps other advantages with the common char-
acteristic that they are provided periodically during the term
of employment and are generally consumed quickly.13 ' These
126. 328 U.S. at 285.
127. S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1948).
128. The current provision, 38 U.S.C.A. § 2021(b) (2) (Supp. 1, Feb.
1975), is identical to the 1948 provision.
129. See, e.g., Foster v. Dravo Corp., 420 U.S. 92, 97 (1975); Tilton
v. Missouri Pac. 'R.R., 376 U.S. 169, 175 (1964); McKinney v. Missouri-
Kan.-Tex. R.R., 357 U.S. 265, 271 (1958).
130. 490 F.2d 55, 62-64 (3d Cir. 1973), affd, 420 U.S. 92 (1975).
131. All wages obviously are not quickly spent. Most, however,
are, just as the benefits from holidays, vacations, sick days, and perhaps
SUBs are rapidly depleted. But even unspent wages are subject to
the employee's current control.
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incidents comprise the short-term benefits a person derives from
his employment.
Under a seniority system, a job frequently provides certain
long-term benefits. A present job is an employee's security for
the future as well as his means of livelihood today. Although
he will still have to work for a paycheck 10 or 20 years hence,
an employee's current work often is a means of "earning" the
knowledge that his employer will provide him the opportunity
to earn short-term benefits in the future. In addition, he may
expect his short-term returns to be increased periodically. Thus,
the fact that an hour of labor today may enable an employee to
receive a higher wage for an hour of labor 10 years hence is a
long-term benefit of his current work. Not all such benefits will
be tied to the seniority provisions in a collective bargaining agree-
ment, however, since in many respects such benefits are but a
product of daily work.132
When the Government conscripts a worker or accepts him as
a volunteer for military service, it necessarily interrupts his
former employment. Such service prevents him from earning
both short-term and long-term benefits from his regular em-
ployer. The military can, however, and to a large extent does,
provide a serviceman with the short-term benefits formerly
realized from his civilian employer. It pays him, feeds him,
clothes him, and provides him some sort of vacation.33 The
military perhaps does not perform these functions as well as a
civilian employer, but it does perform them and could easily
implement a decision to upgrade its level of performance by, for
example, raising pay or increasing annual leave. For its short-
term members, however, the military does not satisfy long-term
job interests'34 and, even if it chose to do so, could not satisfy
132. Suggestions that the long-term nature of a benefit is related to
the applicability of the escalator clause appear in Foster v. Dravo Corp.,
490 F.2d 55, 62 (3d Cir. 1973), afFd, 420 U.S. 92 (1975), and Borges v.
Art Steel Co., 246 F.2d 735, 738-39 (2d Cir. 1957). See also The Supreme
Court, 1965 Term, 80 HAxv. L. REv. 91, 149 (1966). In Foster, both the
Supreme Court and the court of appeals hint at a similar standard for
short-term benefits. 420 U.S. at 100; 490 F.2d at 63. Judge Hastie, in
his concurrence, 490 F.2d at 64, may be suggesting the same considera-
tions.
133. See, e.g., Foster v. Dravo Corp., 490 F.2d 55, 63 (3d Cir. 1973),
affd, 420 U.S. 92 (1975); Austin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 F.2d 1033,
1037 (9th Cir. 1974).
134. This factor explains why statutory reemployment rights are
available only to veterans who have served a limited number of years
in the military. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2024 (Supp. 1, Feb. 1975). See text
accompanying notes 141-42 infra.
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most such interests as well as private employers. The essence
of Fishgold and the escalator clause is recognition of the
unfairness of removing a person from his job, interfering with
both his short- and long-term interests, satisfying the former,
but doing nothing about the loss of the latter. The statute there-
fore should be construed to require the veteran's employer to
provide long-term benefits as if the veteran had earned them,
even though a collective bargaining agreement may have con-
ditioned their receipt on time actually worked.
Such a construction of the statute would unify many pre-
vious attempts to determine the intent of Congress. It responds
to the statement in Fishgold that the veteran should not "lose
ground' z35 by reason of his absence from civilian employment.
The notion of losing ground points to long-term benefits. A loss
of short-term benefits-a vacation in a particular year, for
example-does not comport with the "loss of ground" image.
Rather, the metaphor suggests that workers, especially younger
ones customarily subject to military service, are engaged in build-
ing something for the future.136 The "race" in which ground
is lost is the attempt to establish a secure future. This secure
future is precisely what is meant by' long-term benefits.
The long-term/short-term distinction also addresses the con-
cern expressed in the Senate report accompanying the 1948
codification of the escalator principle1 37 The statutory phrase,
"status in employment," seems to connote something other than
seniority as traditionally defined. 133  It suggests, rather, some-
thing of permanent value or long duration. A worker's employ-
ment status probably would not be affected by denial of credit
for sick days, but would be reduced by failure to qualify for pen-
sion benefits as quickly as other employees. 130 The latter is
a long-term benefit because although a person works toward it
135. 328 U.S. at 285.
136. See 86 CONG. REC. 10,109-10, 10,883-84 (1940) (remarks of
Senator Lodge).
137. See S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1948).
138. The terms "seniority" and "status" are used in 38 U.S.C.A. §
2021 (a) (Supp. 1, 1975). The phrase "status in his employment" is
used in the "escalator clause," section 2021 (b) (1), although in FishgoZd,
from which the clause was derived, the word "seniority" was used.
Had Congress intended to limit the escalator clause to elements within
the traditional definition of seniority, the phrase "seniority in his
employment" would have been a more likely choice.
139. See, e.g., Litwicki v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Indus., Inc., 386
F. Supp. 296 (W.D. Pa.), affd on other grounds, 505 F.2d 189 (3d Cir.
1974).
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daily, it is enhanced over the years and not realized until a sub-
stantial amount of time has passed.
The suggested framework also implements the guidance in
Accardi to focus on the "real nature" of a benefit.140  Sever-
ance pay is a long-term benefit because, as the Supreme Court
there held, it is compensation for forfeiture of a secure job, a
right which the employee has built up over many years.
Furthermore, that the statute applies only to persons in the
service for a short time1 4 1 supports the advocated construction.
Congress has withheld reemployment rights from persons who
remain in the service so long that it can be inferred that they
have selected military service as a career. For those who choose
a military career, the United States Government should be re-
sponsible for providing long-term benefits. And even if a person
chooses eventually to leave the service, there comes a time when
he ought to be regarded as having chosen to forego the long-
term benefits he had been accumulating during civilian employ-
ment. Such a person voluntarily sacrifices those benefits and is
not deprived of them on account of a military commitment.1 42
Most importantly, this analysis yields a construction of the
statute that embodies rights responsive to the problem created
when the Government deprives persons temporarily in military
service of working time they could have used to build future
security. The statutory remedy ought to be directed at preclud-
ing, or at least mitigating, that loss. Unlike the approaches that
the courts thus far have formulated, the long-term/short-term
mode of analysis focuses on the precise problem.
140. The phrase "real nature of a benefit" admits of more than one
meaning. To ask merely whether a particular benefit is "really" a
vacation or "really" a pension does not appreciably further the inquiry.
And although it has been suggested as the proper inquiry, e.g., Foster v.
Dravo Corp., 420 U.S. 92 (1975); Haggard, supra note 2, at 576-80; to
ask no more than whether a particular benefit is "really" earned is of
little assistance. All benefits, including those within the traditional
meaning of seniority, are earned in the sense that to receive them an
employee generally must show up for work with some regularity. As
used here, the phrase is intended to characterize the role of a par-
ticular benefit in a worker's employment objectives. See text accom-
panying notes 89-94 supra.
141. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2024 (Supp. 1, Feb. 1975).
142. See Smith v. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co., 313 F.2d 676, 681-83
(8th Cir. 1963). The grant of reemployment rights to short-term
enlistees is not inconsistent with such a view. Although enlistees have
voluntarily allowed interference in their effort to build long-term
benefits, the notion abounds that citizens have an "obligation" to their
country that may be discharged by serving briefly in the military.
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A variety of examples will serve to illustrate possible
applications of the long-term/short-term approach. The sug-
gested analysis will not lead to the mechanical derivation of
results produced by the tests that the courts previously have
applied. Rather, it will attempt to resolve specific cases by con-
sidering their relationship to the need that spawned the legisla-
tion.
Award of vacation pay in a given year should be classed as
a short-term benefit, for it is transitory, short-lived, and quickly
expended. This would be true whether or not the collective bar-
gaining agreement contained an explicit or implicit work require-
ment. Courts should not search for bizarre results, real or
imagined, for purposes of restoring seniority or status.143 Such
a result seems sensible, since the military surely can, and in fact
does, provide its members with paid leave. Thus, to grant a
returning veteran vacation pay from. his employer for time spent
in the service would result in a double vacation benefit to such
persons. 44 But that unacceptable outcome is simply a reflec-
tion of the short-term nature of the benefit, for it is that nature
which explains the ability of the military to provide the benefit.
On the other hand, the length of vacation for which an
employee may be eligible in years following his return must be
considered a long-term benefit. Customarily, vacation length
increases with years of employment. This benefit is not realized
and expended quickly, but affects an employee's life every year.
It is part of the ever present "ground" an employee may lose
due to absence from work for a period of time. If two employ-
ees begin work on the same date and one subsequently enters
military service, failure to count his years in the service toward
increased vacation length in later years will leave him always
143. Of course, if under the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment such pay was awarded to emplcyees on furlough or leave of
absence, the veteran also should receive the award, although not as a
restoration of seniority or status. The same result would obtain, and
for the same reason, if employees not formally on leave of absence or
furlough in fact received vacation pay without working for it. The
burden to make such a showing, however, would be on the veteran and
the focus of the inquiry would be the practice at the place of employ-
ment, not the language of the agreement. Cf. Haggard, supra note 2, at
576-77, 582.
144. See cases cited in note 133 supra. Vacation pay for a prior
year, most of which was spent in civilian employment, may raise differ-
ent considerations, however. In such circumstances, deprivation, rather
than duplication, of vacation pay would be at issue, if the military
denied a paid vacation to its new member.
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worse off--"behind"-the other. This is precisely the type of
situation that the statute was designed to correct.145
Pension plan benefits admit of somewhat more complex
considerations under the suggested approach. On initial consid-
eration, pension rights seem to come within the notion of long-
term benefits. Certainly an employee works for them daily and
does not realize them until a considerable number of years have
passed. Some questions, however, are raised by the dual nature
of many pension plans and by the existence of statutory retire-
ment benefits for veterans. 46
It is not uncommon for pension plans to separate an em-
ployee's eligibility for benefits from the amount of his monthly
pension check. For example, in Litwicki v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Industries, Inc.147 an employee qualified for payments on
accumulation of ten years of credit. The amount of his check,
however, was computed in proportion to the total years of work
credited. Viewing the opportunity to receive some amount of
regular income after retirement as a future reward for current
labor, the court there concluded that the eligibility-or vesting-
component of a pension plan ought to be regarded as an element
of seniority. As with eligibility for longer vacations, failure to
credit a veteran's service time toward pension qualification
would result in "loss of ground" in his attempt to build security
for the future.
Under a "work requirement" approach, the amount of a
145. See, e.g., Foster v. Dravo Corp., 420 U.S. 92, 101 n.9 (1975).
146. It might be argued that Congress has specifically provided for
direct benefits to veterans, some of them of the long-term variety, and
specifically, some forms of pension. 'Broadly viewed, this argument is
a challenge to the foundation of the statutory construction advocated,
because it suggests that Congress can provide, and has to some extent
provided, such benefits independently of the veteran's former employer.
The difficulty with this reasoning is that it seems fairly clear that
Congress could not provide an equitable, independent means of restoring
to the veteran the traditional elements of seniority. The variety of
private pension plans makes doubtful the ability of Congress to duplicate
for each veteran the pension benefits he would receive privately. The
conditions for qualification and the methods of computing the amounts
to be paid may vary significantly from plan to plan. Thus, the effect
of one veteran's service time on his private pension rights may be
wholly different from the effect of another's. The pension benefits that
Congress has in fact provided clearly are not intended as replacements
for those which might have been earned from private employment, since
they are generally available only to war veterans and the disabled.
38 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1970). See id. §§ 502, 521(a). They are not
general retirement pensions.
147. 386 F. Supp. 296 (W.D. Pa. 1973), affd on other grounds, 505
F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1974).
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pension would almost always be computed without credit for
time spent in military service, since most plans condition em-
ployer contributions to the pension fund on hours worked by
each employee. 148 The suggested analysis, however, probably
would result in crediting such years. Notwithstanding a bona
fide work requirement, the amount of a pension check is nonethe-
less a long-term benefit. Failure to credit the veteran for ser-
vice years will damage him irrevocably vis-A-vis his fellow
employees who did not serve in the military. The underlying
premise of the long-term/short term approach is that Congress
intended to preclude all such damage that might result from an
interruption of employment due to brief military service.149
Another benefit that has given rise to litigation under the
statutory reemployment provisions is supplemental unemploy-
ment benefits (SUBs).150 SUBs are designed to furnish financial
relief in periods of temporary layoff in addition to that provided
under state unemployment compensation laws. SUB plans gen-
erally provide that an employer must grant his employees SUB
credit for the work performed in any given week. Such credit
frequently is subject to a maximum accumulation, however.' 51
In periods of layoff, the employee exchanges the accumulated
SUB credit for a check from his employer. Both the specific
details of a particular SUB plan and. company layoff experience
are relevant to the proper treatmen of a particular plan under
the statute. Because credits will be earned, expended, and earned
again, the suggested analysis probably would result in classify-
ing as short-term benefits SUB credits subject to such expiration
and maximum accumulation, where layoff is a fairly frequent
fact of employment. In such a context, SUBs would be a sub-
stitute for periodic wages, which are short-term benefits. On
the other hand, where layoffs are rare or where no maximum
applies, an employee may accumulate SUB credits and use them
at a future date. In such a case, SUB credits arguably must be
treated as a substitute for the advantages of seniority, such
as preference in layoff order, which go far to ensure an em-
148. See, e.g., id.
149. But see note 146 supra.
150. See Akers v. General Motors Corp., 501 F.2d 1042 (7th Cir.
1974); Hoffman v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1973).
151. Appellee's Appendix on Appeal at 97, Hoffman v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1973). See Akers v. General Motors
Corp., 501 F.2d 1042 (7th Cir. 1974). For a general history of the devel-
opment of SUB plans through 1959, see WIsTERT, supra note 33, at 102-
24, 150-51.
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ployee a relatively constant source of income in the future.152
The nature of this benefit thus may vary from case to case
depending on the maximum accumulation provisions of partic-
ular collective bargaining agreements and on the layoff fre-
quency in particular businesses. Nevertheless, the long-term/
short-term principle offers a sensible means for deciding whether
a returning veteran should receive SUB credit for the time he
spent in military service.
Accardi v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.15 3 illustrates appli-
cation of the suggested principle to severance benefits, the
remaining frequently litigated benefit requiring courts to define
statutory seniority. Severance pay, the Supreme Court said,
is "compensation for loss of job." It meant that the employer
was depriving employees of the security of an available job
for which they had worked for nearly 20 years. Thus the court
correctly held that this long-term interest was within the scope
of the class of benefits that Congress intended to fully restore.
VT CONCLUSION
There doubtless exist forms of employee benefits that have
not been treated in this Article.1 54  Some of them may not
admit of an easy application of the long-term/short-term ap-
proach as a means of determining proper application of the esca-
lator clause. But as the historical treatment of that clause
illustrates, ease and convenience of application do not promise
a result that is responsive to the problem that Congress sought
to remedy. Despite this expected difficulty, courts probably
could apply the suggested principle, with a significant degree of
success, to almost all types of employee benefits. They need not
lay each benefit in one procrustean bed or another, straining to
apply mechanical tests not tailored to congressional concern.
Rather, the likelihood of correctly responding to the problem
that Congress sought to remedy will increase if courts determine
precisely how loss of a particular benefit would disadvantage a
returning veteran relative to other civilian employees.
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